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Abstract: We develop a simple model of task allocation for knowledge workers over their
career within an organization. The human capital theory initiated by Becker (1962, 1964)
has oﬀered a rich analysis of an individual’s life cycle investment in human capital. One
of the main result of this literature states that human capital investments are undertaken
at the early stage of the career because workers have then a longer period of time over
which they can beneﬁt from the return of their investments. In this paper, we consider
a knowledge accumulation problem within an organization that cannot prevent the worker
from quitting and using the knowledge outside the organization. In the ﬁrst best situation,
we show a similar result as in the human capital theory, i.e. the share of time allocated to
knowledge creation tasks decreases over time. We then ask how this pattern is aﬀected when
the knowledge worker can leave the organization and beneﬁt from this knowledge outside the
organization. In this case, we obtain the novel result that the time path of the fraction of
working time allocated to knowledge creation tasks is non-monotone. This fraction is highest
at the early career stage, falls gradually, then rises again, before falling ﬁnally toward zero.
We also show that an increase in the ﬁrm-speciﬁcity of knowledge can increase or decrease
the life-time income of the knowledge worker.
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11 Introduction
The wealth of modern economies depends increasingly on knowledge-based activities and
nowadays knowledge workers represent a large share of the workforce.1,2 Peter Drucker
(1995), credited with coining the term knowledge worker, deﬁnes these individuals as "high
level employees who apply theoretical and analytical knowledge, acquired through formal
education, to develop new products or services." Examples of knowledge workers include
professionals, scientists, educators, information system designers, and academics. These
workers cannot be managed as usual subordinates because knowledge workers are often mo-
tivated by challenging tasks and interested in their work.3
One of the main issues in leading knowledge workers is how to retain them in the ﬁrm,
as monetary incentives alone are often not suﬃcient.4 The nature of the tasks given to
knowledge workers are an important incentive to retain them in the ﬁrm (Prince, 2011).
Companies often propose new tasks to their knowledge workers, and academic departments of
research-oriented universities assign teaching loads and administrative responsibilities (that
constraint research time) that vary along the career path.5
The human capital theory initiated by Becker (1962, 1964) and Mincer (1958, 1962) has
oﬀered a rich analysis of an individual’s life cycle investment in human capital. One of the
main result of this literature states that human capital investments are undertaken at the
early stage of the career because workers have then a longer period of time over which they
can beneﬁt from the return of their investments. Becker’s focus on the investment demand
side has been complemented by supply-side considerations oﬀered by Ben-Porath (1967),
who assumed that an individual must allocate a fraction of his human capital as an input, to
be combined with purchased inputs, in his investment in human capital. Ben-Porath showed
that this fraction is changing over time, and generally it becomes smaller and smaller as the
individual approaches the retirement age.6 Both the Becker mechanism and the Ben-Porath
1According to the OECD (1996), more than 50 per cent of Gross Domestic Product in the major OECD
economies is knowledge-based.
2For 2004, US occupational surveys suggest that jobs that might be categorised as knowledge economy
account for around 27 per cent of total employment. Knowledge workers account for between 40% and 50%
of the workforce in Northern European countries and between 20% to 30% in Southern European countries.
(Source: ILO.)
3See the report on the interview with Robert Austin, Associate Professor at Harvard Business School, in
Science’s Next Wave, 26 April 2002. Drucker argues that knowledge workers have to be led rather than to
be managed.
4Alberto Savoia, a former Google engineer, "left Google in 2002 to start a software company [...] He left
240,000 unvested options on the table, worth $120 million had he stayed".(Forbes.com, 2007).
5For instance, Google’s engineers can work 20% of their time on independant projects.
6Ben-Porath made the distinction between observed earnings and earnings net of all investment costs:
2mechanism predict that for any individual the investment in human capital declines over
time. In this paper, we consider a diﬀerent mechanism that, unlike the other two previous
mechanisms, is capable of producing a non-monotone path of investment in human capital.
The driver behind our result is the role of the employer, who actively oﬀers the knowledge
workers time-varying ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial incentives to stay with the ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst
best situation, where the employer and the knowledge worker can sign binding contracts, we
show a result similar to the standard human capital theory, i.e., the share of time allocated
to a knowledge creation task decreases over time. In the second-best situation, where the
knowledge worker can leave the organization and use the accumulated knowledge to earn
income outside the organization, we show that the time path of investment in human capital
can be non-monotone.
More precisely, we study the problem of an organization which seeks the optimal allo-
cation of the working time of a knowledge worker between two types of tasks, knowledge-
creation tasks and routine tasks, along the career of the knowledge worker as an instrument
to retain her in the organization. The knowledge creation tasks add to the employee’s
knowledge stock, which itself generates proﬁts for the ﬁrm, and at the same time increase
the employee’s income prospect in outside options. This latter aspect provides incentives for
her to quit the ﬁrm. How much her knowledge stock is useful in outside option employment
depends on the extent to which the knowledge is ﬁrm-speciﬁc.The routine tasks contribute
to the immediate proﬁts for the ﬁrm but do not add to the employee’s knowledge stock. The
ﬁrm therefore faces both a static tradeoﬀ and a dynamic tradeoﬀ in deciding on the fraction
of time to be allocated to the knowledge creation tasks. We assume that the employer oﬀers
a contract that stipulates the fraction of working time the employee has to spend in the
routine tasks. At any point of time the employee has the option to leave the ﬁrm. We inves-
tigate the nature of the terms of employment that would maximize the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ, subject
to the constraint that suﬃcient incentives are given to ensure that the employee would not
gain by quitting.
One of our novel results is that the allocation of working time between the knowledge
creation tasks and the routine tasks evolves non-monotonically. At the beginning of her
career, the worker is asked to spend a large share of her time in the knowledge creation
tasks, but gradually she is asked to allocate an increasing share of time to the routine tasks.
Around the middle of her career, this trend reverses and the employer allows the knowledge
worker to devote more and more time to the knowledge creation tasks. Toward the end
the former are always higher, change slower, and peaks at an earlier date than the latter.
3of her career, the trend reverses again and the knowledge worker is asked to perform more
and more routine tasks. We also show that the higher the degree of ﬁrm-speciﬁcity of the
stock of knowlege, the greater will be the amount of knowledge accumulated over the whole
horizon. Somewhat surprisingly, an increase in the ﬁrm-speciﬁcity of knowledge can increase
or decrease the life-time income of the knowledge worker.
An example that seems to ﬁt our model is academic contracts. Academics perform re-
search tasks but also teaching and administrative tasks. Research is a cumulative investment
for the academic and the university department, and it is valuable outside the employee’s
current organization, whereas teaching and administrative tasks generate value for the uni-
versity but are less valuable for the academic outside the university. The chairman of the
department normally gives reduced teaching loads (course reduction) to young researchers,
but such reduction falls as the years go by. Later in the career, academics can leave tempo-
rally for sabbatical periods, which allow them to spend more time on their research.
As already mentionned, our paper contributes to the literature on the accumulation of
human capital within an organizational context. Other papers have considered the human
capital accumulation problem within an organization. Smid and Volkerink (1999) extend
the analysis of speciﬁc schooling by Hashimoto (1981) by introducing non-speciﬁc or general
schooling within a two-period framework. In the ﬁrst period, the employer and the em-
ployee not only have to choose the level of investment in human capital and the division of
costs and beneﬁts, but also have to decide on the speciﬁcity of the training. In the second
period, (private) information on the productivity of schooling becomes available, and the
employee may decide to quit, or the employer may dismiss the employee. They analyze the
consequences of subsidies or taxes on schooling. The degree of speciﬁcity of training is an
also important feature of our paper. However, we consider the speciﬁcity of knowledge as
an exogenous parameter and analyse its inﬂuence on knowledge accumulation and on the
life-time earning of the knowledge worker.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the hold-up problem by exploring a trade-
oﬀ that has not been analysed previously. On the one hand, by letting the knowledge
worker accumulate knowledge early, the employer obtains large returns on this investment
as long as the worker stays with the ﬁrm, but the incentives for the worker to quit becomes
stronger over time until she approaches her retirement age. On the other hand, letting the
knowledge worker accumulate knowledge later, the employer obtains lower returns because
the remaining horizon is shorter, but the incentives for the worker to quit become weaker.
Hvide and Kristiansen (2011) also deal with the management of knowledge workers. They
4study how ﬁrm-speciﬁc complementary assets and intellectual property rights aﬀect the
management of knowledge workers. They focus on the trade-oﬀ between moral hazard and
hold-up.
The hold-up problem is a crucial factor in the determination of the evolution of a bilateral
relationship when agents make, ex ante, sunk and speciﬁc investments which will increase,
ex post, the surplus of the relationship. Then, being unable, ex ante, to secure a share of
the surplus in relation to the amount of their sunk investments, later agents will have to
negotiate the division of the surplus, taking account that their bargaining power will have
changed.7The hold-up problem emerges in many bilateral exchanges, such as (i) workers
and ﬁrms invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets whose returns are shared through subsequent wage
negotiation, or (ii) manufacturers and suppliers customize their equipment and production
processes to their partners, (iii) team production, (iv) reallocation/dissolution of partnership
assets, (v) political lobbying, and so on. Without special protections, the hold-up problem
will lead parties to under-invest in speciﬁc assets.8
Our model is related to dynamic models of hold-up. Guriev and Kvasov (2005) show
that if contracts are allowed to extend beyond the breakup of relationship, then eﬃciency can
be achieved by a sequence of constantly renegotiated ﬁxed term contracts, or a perpetual
contract that allows unilateral termination with advanced notice. In our model, after the
breakup the employer is allowed only limited compensation, and therefore eﬃciency is not
achieved. In Pitchford and Snyder (2004) the seller can make gradual investment install-
ments, and the buyer has an incentive to pay after each installment, so the hold-up problem
can be mitigated, if there is no known, ﬁnite end to the number of installments. In our
model, there is a ﬁnite end to the installments because the time horizon is ﬁnite. Further-
more, installment payments are not possible because the employee cannot borrow, and does
not have adequate income to post a bond during training.
Che and Sakovics (2004) consider the role of anticipated future investments in a joint
project. Two partners make investments and negotiate to share the surplus with an inﬁnite
horizon. Players receive payments only when an agreement is reached or when the game
7This is "the fundamental transformation" (Williamson, 1979), the value of their speciﬁc investments
being diﬀerent "out of the relationship" than "within".
8Various remedies have been proposed as safeguards against holdup, ranging from vertical integration
(Klein et al.,1978, Williamson,1979), property rights allocation (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore,
1990), contracting on renegotiation rights (Chung, 1991, Aghion et al., 1994), option contracts (Nöldeke
and Schmidt, 1995, 1998), production contracts (Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996), relational contracts (Baker,
Gibbons, and Murphy (2002)), ﬁnancial rights allocation (Aghion and Bolton,1992, Dewatripont and Tirole,
1994, and Dewatripont et al. 2003) and hierarchical authority (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) to injecting market
competition (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993, Acemoglu and Shimer,1999, Felli and Roberts, 2000, and Che
and Gale, 2003).
5ends. Their main result is that for suﬃciently patient players, the hold-up problem may
be alleviated because of the shadow of the future. Smirnov and Wait (2004) focus on the
timing of investments in a bilateral relationship where (i) two players can invest only once,
and (ii) trade occurs only once and only if both players have made a speciﬁc investment.
Their paper shows that if the potential investment horizon is continually extended, players
pass in alternation from a prisoners’ dilemma to a coordination game. Our model is very
diﬀerent from Che and Sakovics (2004) and Smirnov and Wait (2004) as we study a situation
where players get payments all along the game. Compte and Jehiel (2003) study the eﬀect of
outside option (the value of which changes over time, depending on the history of oﬀers and
concessions) on the equilibrium of a bargaining game. They consider a complete information
game that has two features. First, at any point of time, each party has the option to
terminate the game (in contrast to our model, where only one party, namely the employee,
has this option). Second, in case of termination, the payoﬀs are assumed to depend on the
history of oﬀers or concessions made in the bargaining process. They show that for a large
class of such games, gradualism is a necessary feature. They also derive an upper bound on
concessions.
Finally, even though our model’s main focus is on how the time path of human capital
accumulation is distorted because of incomplete contracts, it is also potentially useful for
thinking about the “exploration and exploitation” relationship which has been discussed in
the management literature where adaptive processes balance between the exploration of new
possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties (Schumpeter 1934, Holland 1975). Accord-
ing to March (1991), “exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, variation,
risk taking, experimentation, play, ﬂexibility, discovery, innovation”, while exploitation “in-
cludes such things as reﬁnement, choice, production, eﬃciency, selection, implementation,
execution”. As noted by Ben Porath (1967), the pioneering work of Becker (1962, 1964)
emphasized the demand side of human capital formation. Thus, Becker’s focus is on the
exploitation motive. Ben Porath (1967) emphasized the supply side, the investment costs.
This reﬂects the exploration motive. In our paper we consider the two interrelated motives
within an organization where the value of the outside option evolves endogenously. Our
non-monotonicity result, which shows that the rate of change in knowledge comes in sudden
bursts, may be viewed in the light of the theory of punctuated dynamics (Eldredge and
Gould 1972), according to which evolution is not a gradual process. Periods of exploration
where things change drastically are inserted between prolonged periods of exploitation where
only minor changes take place.
62 Model and notations
The time horizon T represents the maximal career duration of the employee. Each period,
the employee is endowed with a ﬁxed working time (normalized to 1) to be split between
time spent on the knowledge creation task, k (t), and time spent on the usual task, u(t).
The time constraint of the employee is k (t)+u(t) = 1. The employee’s cumulated knowledge
at t is K (t) =
  t
0 k (τ)dτ.
Each period the employee obtains an ego-rent I (K (t)) (with I (0) ≥ 0, I′ > 0 and
I′′ ≤ 0), which may be interpreted as her valuation of the prestige or pleasure derived from
this stock. Inside the ﬁrm, the proﬁt at time t generated by the employee’s cumulated
knowledge is denoted π (K (t)) with π (0) ≥ 0, π′ > 0 and π′′ ≤ 0.
We make a natural assumption concerning outside options: if the employee leaves the
ﬁrm at time t, her expected future revenue (per period) is an increasing function of the
stock of knowledge cumulated up to t. Her earning outside the ﬁrm will then be ˆ π (K (t)),
where we assume that ˆ π (K) ≤ π(K), i.e. knowledge is more useful inside the ﬁrm than
outside, and that ˆ π (0) ≥ 0, ˆ π
′ > 0 and ˆ π
′′ ≤ 0. Counting ego rent, she receives s(K (t)) ≡
ˆ π (K (t))+I (K (t)) each period of time τ > t outside the ﬁrm, using the knowledge cumulated
up to t. After the employee quits, the ﬁrm obtains a constant value (normalized to 0) each
remaining period of time.
As long as the employee remains with the ﬁrm, it earms the proﬁt π(K(t)), and an
additional amount v (u(t)) if the employee spends a fraction u(t) of her time endowment on
the routine tasks. Assume that for all k ∈ [0,1], v (k) ≥ 0, v′ (0) > 0 and v′′(k) < 0. The
employee and the employer have the same discount rate r ≥ 0.
At time t = 0, the employer and the employee sign a contract. The contract speciﬁes
the fraction k(τ) of working time that must be devoted to the knowledge creation task,
the remaining fraction being allocated to the routine task, τ ∈ [0,T], and a wage proﬁle
represented by w(τ) for τ ∈ [0,T]. Thus, if the employee quits at time t, the cumulated




















73 First best solution: the optimal length of a relation-
ship
For the sake of simplicity, we assume in the following that the discount rate is r = 0. If the








where k (t) + u(t) = 1. The opportunity cost of knowledge can be written as v (u(t)) =

















where 0 ≤ k (t) ≤ 1 and subject to
˙ K(t) = k(t), (3)
K(0) = 0 (given). (4)
Clearly, since s(K) ≤ I(K) + π(K) for all K ≥ 0 and since v(1 − k) ≥ 0 for all feasible
k ∈ [0,1], the solution of the joint surplus maximization problem displays the plausible
property that the two parties stay together until T. Another property concerns the fraction
of time devoted to the knowledge creation task is decreasing over time, which is described
in the following Proposition.9
Proposition 1 [First best allocation of time between tasks]: The optimal duration
of the relationship is t∗ = T and the optimal (interior) splitting of working time is such that
the share of time allocated to knowledge accumulation is decreasing whereas the share of time
allocated to the routine task is increasing (˙ k < 0 and ˙ u > 0).
The joint surplus maximization requires that the share of working time allocated to the
knowledge task decreases over time and that the share of time allocated to the routine task
increases over time. In other words, the share of the routine task is gradually becoming
dominant. Knowledge is accumulated mainly at the beginning of the career because the
sooner the investment in the knowledge task, the larger the cumulative beneﬁts. When the
employee approaches the end of the horizon, the knowledge task becomes less attractive
because there is less remaining time to exploit knowledge.
9All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
8Let us illustrate this result with an example:
Example 1 [First best allocation of time between tasks]: Let us specify the functions
as follows. π (K) = AK with A > 0, ˆ π (K) = βAK with β ∈ (0,1), I (K) = DK with D ≥ 0
and v (u) = u − 1
2u2. We also assume that (A + D)T ≤ 1 which ensures the existence of an
interior solution.
k (t) = (A + D)(T − t) and u(t) = 1 − (A + D)(T − t)
(T = 1, A + D = 1/2)
The ﬁrst best solution is based on the assumption that both parties can commit to con-
tinuing their relationship until T. However, since the employee is accumulating knowledge,
the value of her outside option is increasing over time, hence if the employee is free to quit
at any time, she would have an incentive to quit unless the employer promises her suﬃcient
reward for staying with the ﬁrm. This reward can come in two forms: a monetary reward,
such as a time proﬁle of salary that increases with seniority, or a prospect of accelerated
increase in human capital in the future (which tilts the time path of her ego rent and that
of her outside option toward the future). The next section investigates this issue.
4 How to retain a knowledge worker using monetary
rewards and non-monotone path of working time al-
location
We now consider the situation where the knowledge worker can quit at any time t ∈ (0,T),
taking with her the knowledge that she has acquired while being employed. The ﬁrm has
two instruments to retain the worker: it prescribes a time path of allocation of working time
between the knowledge creation task and the routine task, and it gives a monetary payment
to the knowledge worker. We derive the properties of the optimal splitting of working time
9when the employer designs a scheme that prevents the knowledge worker from quitting the
ﬁrm before the retirement age T. An interesting feature of our model is the optimal trade
oﬀ (from the ﬁrm’s vantage point) between these two instruments. The ﬁrm can maintain
the ﬁrst best time allocation scheme and keep the employee by promising a large sum of of
terminal payment ST, on the condition that the employee stays with it until T. But such a
policy would be too expensive. The terminal payment can be much reduced if the employee
has less valuable outside option, and this can be achieved if the ﬁrm reduces her path of
accumulated human capital below the ﬁrst best path. While this is intuitively plausible,
what is not clear is whether it would be optimal for the ﬁrm to design a non-monotone path
of working time allocation. Let us turn to this issue.
The knowledge worker receives a non-negative wage, w(τ), at time τ. We assume that the
ﬁrm cannot ask the worker to post a bond and it cannot ask her to pay any compensation




I (K (τ))dτ and a cumulated wage
T  
t
w(τ)dτ. If she chooses to leave
the ﬁrm at time t, her payoﬀ for the remaining working life is V 0 (t) = (T − t)s(K(t)). It is
important to notice that the value of her outside option, denoted by V 0 (t), evolves through
time. The worker will not quit before the time horizon T if the ﬁrm oﬀers her a contract
such that the following non-quitting constraint is satisﬁed:
  T
t
w(τ)dτ ≥ (T − t)s(K(t)) −
  T
t
I (K (τ))dτ for all t ∈ [0,T]. (5)




[π(K(τ)) + v(1 − k(τ)) − w(τ)]dτ (6)
subject to
˙ K(t) = k(t), (7)
K(0) = 0 (ﬁxed), (8)
and the non-quitting constraint (5).





By inspecting the objective function (6) and the constraint (5) and recalling the assump-
tion that the employer can commit to honor the contract, we can see that the employer can
10pay the worker the lump sum ST at the end of the horizon, instead of spreading it over many
periods. Does the possibility of introducing a non-monotone path of working time allocation
help the ﬁrm to keep the worker, while trimming down the lump sum incentive component
ST? The following proposition and numerical example provide an answer to this question.
Proposition 2 [Second best allocation of time between tasks]: The second best
program is very diﬀerent from the ﬁrst best program, and can be characterized as follows. If
k (t) > 0 over [0,T),
(i) There exist at least one time interval (t′,t′′) over which k(t) is increasing, i.e.
the employer promises a phase of acceleration of human capital accumulation in order to
induce the agent to stay longer.
(ii) There exists tb < T, such that over the interval [tb,T], k(t) will be falling (˙ k < 0).
(iii) There exists ta > 0, such that over the interval [0,ta], k(t) will be falling (˙ k < 0).
The second best allocation scheme oﬀered by the ﬁrm diﬀers from the ﬁrst best because,
knowing that the worker has the freedom to quit at any time, it has to propose a contract in
which the path of allocation of working time between tasks and the wage proﬁle are suitably
designed to counter the worker’s incentives to leave the ﬁrm. The employer distorts the path
of knowledge accumulation in order to reduce the total wage payment it has to give to retain
the worker. It manipulates the evolution of her outside option, V 0 (t) = (T − t)s(K(t)).
Let us illustrate the intuition of this result with an example:
Example 2 [Second best allocation of time between tasks]: Let us specify the func-
tions as follows. π (K) = AK with A > 0, ˆ π (K) = βAK with β ∈ (0,1), I (K) = DK with
D ≥ 0 and v (u) = u− 1
2u2. Assuming that k increases over only one interval [ta,tb], the opti-
mal path of knowledge accumulation and the optimal fraction of working time devoted to the
knowledge task can be illustrated with the following graphs (T = 1,A = 1,D = 0,β = 0.8).10











10The resolution of the ﬁrm’s problem under this speciﬁcation is relegated to the appendix.






Knowledge task share of working time
The intuition behind Proposition 2 can be illustrated in this example. The outside option
of the knowledge worker is given by:
V
0 (t) = (T − t)AβK(t).
Now let us compare how the outside option evolves through time when the employer uses
the ﬁrst best working time splitting path and when he uses the second best path:








Knowledge worker’s outside option
The dotted curve (respectively, the continuous curve) represents the outside option of the
knowledge worker when the employer uses the ﬁrst best (respectively, second best) allocation
of working time. In the second best situation, the ﬁrm has to give a cumulated wage that
fulﬁls condition (5). If it uses the ﬁrst best path, it has to pay an amount ST ≃ 0.08 to the
worker at the end of the horizon. According to proposition 2, this is not optimal. If instead
the ﬁrm uses the second best path, the outside option curve becomes ﬂatter and it only has
to pay around 0.025 to the knowledge worker.
In order to focus on the time allocation proﬁle, we have made the simplifying assumption
that the employer can defer payments of the salary mass ST (except for possibly some basic
amount per period, say w, which we have normalized to zero) until the end of the time
horizon. This assumption can be easily relaxed. Notice that in the third panel of this
12example, the worker’s outside option reaches a plateau and stays constant over an interval
[ta,tb]. Over this interval, Y ∗(t) = ST, with Y ∗(t) = (T − t)s(K∗(t))−
  T
t I (K∗ (τ))dτ and
K∗(t) is the (second best) optimal path of cumulated knowledge. Afterwards, over the time
interval [tb,T], Y ∗(t) declines monotonely toward zero. This indicates that the salary mass
ST can be paid in installments over the time interval [tb,T]. What is required is that
  T
tb




∗(t) for all t ∈ [tb,T]




∗(t) for all t ∈ [tb,T] (9)
Then, diﬀerentiating (9), we obtain
w(t) = − ˙ Y
∗(t) for all t ∈ [tb,T]
and
˙ w(t) = −¨ Y
∗(t) for all t ∈ [tb,T].
The time path of wage over [tb,T] can thus be computed and plotted, using the above
numerical example.







The wage of the knowledge worker is at ﬁrst constant and then increases up to the end of
her career.
5 Eﬀect of the speciﬁcity of knowledge
In this section we focus on the role of the speciﬁcity of knowledge on the second best contract
scheme. Becker (1962) distinguishes two categories of human capital, speciﬁc and general
13human capital. Speciﬁc human capital is related to a speciﬁc ﬁrm’s products or services
whereas general human capital can be used in a large range of diﬀerent ﬁrms. Along these
lines, we now study the eﬀect of the degree of speciﬁcity of knowledge (β = 0 being full speci-
ﬁcity and β = 1 being full general knowledge) on (a) the duration of the time period [ta,tb]
where time devoted to the knowledge task k is increasing;11 (b) the amount of knowledge




w(τ)dτ. We concentrate on the following speciﬁcation of the general model: we
assume, as in examples 1 and 2 that the proﬁt generated by knowledge inside the ﬁrm is
proportional to the accumulated amount of knowledge, π (K) = AK. The degree of knowl-
edge speciﬁcity is denoted β ∈ (0,1). The proﬁt generated by knowledge outside the ﬁrm is
then ˆ π (K) = βAK. The value of the routine task is speciﬁed as v (u) = u − 1
2u2. Finally,
for the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is no ego rent, i.e. I (K) = 0. Using this
speciﬁcation, we can show the following result:
Proposition 3 [Speciﬁcity of knowledge]: As knowledge becomes more speciﬁc (β de-
creases):
(i) The phase of increasing fraction of time devoted to the knowledge task becomes shorter.
Formally, |tb − ta| decreases when β decreases.
(ii) The total amount of knowledge accumulated over the whole horizon increases. For-
mally, K (T) increases when β decreases.
(iii) The change in the total wage of the knowledge worker is ambiguous. This is because
while the total wage increases with β for a given K (T), the latter decreases with β.
The ﬁrst two results (i) and (ii) are quite intuitive. When knowledge becomes more
ﬁrm-speciﬁc, the value of the outside option of the knowledge worker becomes smaller and
it becomes easier to retain her, i.e. the situation is then closer to the ﬁrst best situation.
Then the duration of the phase where k increases becomes smaller. (Note that there is no
such phase in the ﬁrst best case, which is incentive compatible in the situation where β = 0).
The total amount of knowledge accumulated over the whole horizon also increases.
To understand the third point (iii), note that an increase in the speciﬁcity of knowledge
has two eﬀects on the outside option, which work in opposite directions. On the one hand,
the more speciﬁc the knowledge, the lower the value of the outside option of the knowledge
worker, and this allows the employer to oﬀer her a lower total wage. On the other hand,
when knowledge becomes more speciﬁc, the employer can aﬀord to leave her more time to
11We assume here that there is only one interval of time where k increases.
14accumulate knowledge. Hence, the amount of accumulated knowledge is larger which in
turn increases the knowledge worker’s outside option. These two opposite eﬀects explain the
ambiguous eﬀect of knowledge speciﬁcity on the worker’s wage. As an illustrative example,
Table 1 summarizes our numerical results for A = 1 and T = 47:
β ta tb Vf ST
0 / / 34055 0
0.2 19.32 21.23 23334 3422.3
0.4 18.64 22.68 16181 5752.3
0.6 17.79 24.22 10342 7095.5
0.7 17.29 25.01 7856.6 7438.4
0.8 16.72 25.86 5587.2 7555.5
0.85 16.45 26.23 4628.9 7617.1
0.9 16.15 26.64 3667.2 7595.8
0.95 15.83 27.05 2751.9 7543.1
1 15.40 27.60 1649.9 7210.3
Table 1: numerical results
In this example, the total wage of the knowledge worker is indeed not monotonic with
respect to the degree of speciﬁcity of knowledge. The total wage increases when knowledge
is suﬃciently speciﬁc, i.e. β ∈ [0,0.85], and decreases when knowledge is suﬃciently general
β ∈ [0.9,1].
6 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a simple model of task allocation for knowledge workers. We obtain
the novel result that the time path of the fraction of working time allocated to a knowl-
edge creation task is non-monotone. This fraction is highest at the early career stage, falls
gradually, then rises again, before falling ﬁnally toward zero. This feature seems consistent
with stylized facts in academic careers. The phenomenon is explained in terms of the em-
ployer’s design of incentive contracts that motivate the knowledge worker not to quit. We
introduced a variable Y (t) that represents the worker’s valuation of her outside opportu-
nity (net of the present value of future non-wage beneﬁts that she must forgo if she quits
at time t). We showed that the employer manipulates the time path of this variable by
prescribing a non-monotone path of work time allocation. There is at least one interval of
time where the fraction of time allocated to the knowledge creation task increases. This is
practically an appeal by the employer to the mid-carreer worker: “if you stay with me, your
will accumulate knowledge at a faster rate than in the past.” In this second best world, the
15worker’s valuation of her outside opportunity reaches a plateau (rather than a peak, as in
the joint-maximization scenario) and falls only in the last stage of her career.
For simplicity, we have assumed that the ﬁrm defers payments of the salary mass (except
for possibly some basic amount per period) until the end of the time horizon. We have
indicated that this can be relaxed, allowing the ﬁrm to spread the salary mass over a number
of periods.
Our model has a number of limitations which are necessary to keep the analysis simple.
For instance, we have assumed that the employer can make binding commitment. In a future
extension, we would allow both sides to renegotiate at each point of time. This could result
in a unique wage proﬁle.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Since   π (K) < π (K), the value of knowledge is larger when
the employee stays with the ﬁrm, the optimal quitting time is t∗ = T. The joint surplus






−rτ (I (K (τ)) + π (K (τ)) + v (1 − k (τ)))dτ,
where 0 ≤ k (τ) ≤ 1 and ˙ K(τ) = k(τ).
Let ψ be the co-state variable, λ and µ be the multipliers associated with the constraint
k ≥ 0 and 1 − k ≥ 0. Write the Lagrangian
L = I (K) + π (K) + v (1 − k) + ψk + λk + µ(1 − k) (10)




′(1 − k) + ψ + λ − µ = 0 (11)
λ ≥ 0, k ≥ 0, 1 ≥ k λk = 0, µ(1 − k) = 0 (12)
˙ ψ = rψ −
∂L
∂K
= rψ − I
′ (K) − π
′ (K) (13)
and the transversality condition is
ψ(T) = 0 (14)
Then  























′ (K (τ)) + π
′ (K (τ)))e
−rτdτ > 0 for all t < T (17)
Assuming an interior solution, we have µ(t) = λ(t) = 0. Using (17) and (11) and diﬀeren-
tiating, we have
−v
′′(1 − k)˙ k = ˙ ψ < 0 (18)
(Note: along the optimal path it must hold that ˙ ψ(t) < 0 because if ˙ ψ(t) were ever positive
or zero at some t then it would not be possible for ψ to reach zero at T) ￿
Proof of Proposition 2:
The ﬁrm oﬀers to the employee a package deal whereby it pays her a sum ST at time T,
provided that she stays with the ﬁrm until time T, and works for the ﬁrm according to a
prescribed time allocation scheme (k(τ),1−k(τ)) where k(τ) is the fraction of the workday
to be spent on the knowledge creation task, and 1 − k(τ) is the fraction of the day to be
spent on other tasks. If the employee quits at any time t < T, she will forfeit the sum ST,




s(K(t))dt = (T − t)s(K(t)).





The employee will stay with the ﬁrm until T if and only if Vw(t) ≥ Vq(t) for all t ∈ [0,T].
Thus, the ﬁrm’s package deal must satisfy the non-quitting constraint
ST ≥ (T − t)s(K(t)) −
  T
t
I(K(τ))dτ for all t ∈ [0,T].
It is convenient to introduce the following state variable




The variable Y (t) represents the worker’s valuation of her outside opportunity (net of the
present value of future non-wage beneﬁts that she must forgo if she quits at time t). Then,
17recalling that ˙ K(t) = k(t), we obtain the following diﬀerential equation for the state variable
Y (t) :
˙ Y (t) = (T − t)s
′(K(t))k(t) − s(K(t)) + I(K(t)) ≡ g(t,k(t),K(t)), Y (T) = 0,
and the non-quitting constraint becomes
ST − Y (t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0,T].
The ﬁrm must now choose the time path of the control variable k(t), and the terminal




[π(K(t)) + v(1 − k(t))]dt − ST ≡
  T
0
[π(K(t)) + v(1 − k(t))]dt + G(ST)
subject to the diﬀerential equations for K(t) and Y (t), with boundary conditions K(0) =
0,Y (T) = 0, K(T) free, Y (0) free, and the inequality constraints ST−Y (t) ≥ 0, 0 ≤ k(t) ≤ 1.
Since the constraint ST −Y (t) ≥ 0 involves a constant ST which is to be chosen optimally
(as ST also appears in the ﬁrm’s objective function Vf), it is treated as a control parame-
ter, and the necessary conditions can be derived using Hestenes’s approach (see Long and
Leonard, 1992, Chapter 7, Theorem 7.8.1, pp. 247-250, or Takayama (1985, pp 657-660).
Necessary conditions
Let ψ(t) and ρ(t) be the co-state variables associated with the state variables K(t) and
Y (t) respectively. Let λ(t), µ(t) and ϕ(t) be the multipliers associated with the inequality
constrants k(t) ≥ 0, 1 − k(t) ≥ 0 and ST − Y (t) ≥ 0. Deﬁne
g(K,k,t) ≡ (T − t)s
′(K)k − s(K) + I(K)
Deﬁne the Hamiltonian H and the Lagragian L as follows
H = π(K) + v(1 − k) + ψk + ρg(K,k,t)
L = H + λk + µ[1 − k] + ϕ[ST − Y ]




′(1 − k) + ψ + λ − µ = 0 (19)
λ ≥ 0, k ≥ 0, λk = 0, µ ≥ 0, 1 − k ≥ 0, µ(1 − k) = 0
ϕ ≥ 0, ST − Y ≥ 0, ϕ(ST − Y ) = 0












The following three transversality conditions are also necessary. Since KT and Y0 are free,
ψ(T) = 0
ρ(0) = 0













ϕ(t)dt = 0. (21)
Since ϕ(t) ≥ 0, equation (21) implies that there must exist at least a time interval (t′,t′′)
where ϕ(t) is strictly positive. On each interval (t′,t′′) where ϕ(t) > 0, we have ST = Y .
Hence ˙ Y (t) = 0 and ¨ Y (t) = 0 for all t ∈ (t′,t′′). Speciﬁcally
¨ Y (t) = −s
′k − s
′k + (T − t)s
′′k
2 + (T − t)s
′˙ k + I





(2s′ − I′)k − (T − t)s′′k2




′ + I′)k − (T − t)s′′k2
(T − t)  π
′ > 0 for all t ∈ (t
′,t
′′) (23)
There may be more than one interval where ϕ(t) > 0. Let ta be such that ϕ(t) = 0 for all
t ∈ [0,ta] and tb be such that ϕ(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [tb,T].
Over [0,ta], we have ϕ(t) = 0 then ˙ ρ = 0. Since ρ(0) = 0, we have ρ(t) = 0 for all
t ∈ [0,ta]. Conditions (19) and (20) give
v
′ = ψ and ˙ ψ = −π
′ for all t ∈ [0,ta]
Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst equality above with respect to time, we obtain
˙ ψ = −v
′′˙ k = −π
′ < 0 for all [0,ta] (24)
which implies that ˙ k < 0.
19Over [tb,T], we have ϕ(t) = 0 then ˙ ρ = 0. Hence ρ(t) = ρ(tb) =
  tb
ta ϕ(s)ds = 1.
Conditions (19) and (20) can be rewritten as follows:
v
′ − (T − t)s
′ = ψ for all t ∈ [tb,T] (25)
and,
˙ ψ = −π
′ − (−s






′ − (T − t)s
′′k, for all t ∈ [tb,T] (27)
Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst equality above with respect to time, we have:
˙ ψ = −v
′′˙ k + s




′ − (T − t)s
′′k (28)
Then, we conclude
˙ k = −
π′ + I′
−v′′ < 0 for all t ∈ [tb,T] (29)
If there are at least two intervals where ϕ(t) > 0, there must exist an interval (t1,t2)
such that ϕ(t) = 0 for all t ∈ (t1,t2) and ϕ(t1 − ε) > 0 and ϕ(t2 + ε) > 0. Over (t1,t2), we
have ˙ ρ = 0 and
0 ≤ ρ(t) = ρ(t1) =
  t1
ta
ϕ(τ)dτ < 1 for all t ∈ (t1,t2)
Condition (19) gives
0 = −v
′ + ψ + ρ(t1){(T − t)s
′} for all t ∈ (t1,t2) (30)
Diﬀerentiating this equation with respect to time leads to:
˙ ψ = −v
′′˙ k + ρ(t1){s
′ − (T − t)s
′′k}, for all t ∈ (t1,t2) (31)
and using (20), we have:
˙ ψ = −v
′′˙ k + ρ(t1){s










−v′′ < 0 for all t ∈ (t1,t2). ￿ (34)
20Proof of Proposition 3: We use the results derived in example 2 with D = 0. We ﬁrst
show point (i). Using (68) and combining (63) and (70), we obtain two conditions that





































(T − 2ta)(T − ta)





















(T − 2ta)(T − ta)
 
.
This condition characterizes ta as a function of β. Diﬀerentiating this condition with respect




3Ata (T − ta)
2 (T − 2ta)
2
 




The function ta  → 1
2
(ta)2(T−ta)2
(T−2ta) increases with respect to ta. Indeed, the derivative of the
function ta  → (ta)
2 (T − ta)





> 0. Using (36), we have
that tb decreases when ta increases. Hence, tb increases with respect to β.
Now consider point (ii). Using (63), (64) and (72), the total amount of accumulated
knowledge is given by:
K (T) = 2A(T − tb)
2 .
Hence K (T) decreases with respect to β.
Regarding point (iii), we have
ST = Y (tb) = (T − tb)βAK(tb)
= βA









21Material for the examples and a suﬃciency theorem
Computations for Example 1: Assuming an interior solution, the ﬁrst order conditions
for the ﬁrst best programme become:
ψ = k, (37)
˙ ψ = −(A + D), (38)
and,
ψ(T) = 0. (39)
Integration of (38) leads to
ψ (t) = (A + D)(T − t),
and then, the ﬁrst best working time splitting is such that
k (t) = (A + D)(T − t). ￿
Computations for Example 2:
Assuming an interior solution, the ﬁrst order conditions for the second best programme
become:
−k + ψ + ρ(T − t)(βA + D) = 0, (40)
˙ ψ = −(A + D) + ρβA (41)
˙ ρ = ϕ (42)
ϕ(t) ≥ 0, ST − Y (t) ≥ 0, (43)
ϕ(t)[ST − Y ] = 0 (44)
ψ(T) = 0 (45)
ρ(0) = 0, (46)
  T
0
ϕ(t)dt = 1 (47)
where,




22Let us ﬁnd the solution such that k increases over only one interval [ta,tb]. Over this interval,








for all t ∈ [ta,tb].











and then for all t ∈ [ta,tb],







Using (23) we have, over [ta,tb]:
˙ k =
(2ˆ π
′ + I′)k − (T − t)s′′k2






Integrating over [ta,t] and rearranging, we have







Now by diﬀerentiating (49) we obtain, for all t ∈ [ta,tb] :

















Over [0,ta] we have ϕ(t) = 0. Using (46), (42), (40) and (41), we obtain
ψ = k and ˙ ψ = −(A + D) (54)
Integrating ˙ ψ over [t,ta], we have, for all t ∈ [0,ta] :
k (t) = k (ta) − (A + D)(t − ta).
23Integrating this equation over [0,t], we have, for all t ∈ [0,ta] :
K (t) = k (ta)t − (A + D)
t2
2












Over [tb,T] we have ϕ(t) = 0 and ρ(t) = 1. Conditions (40) and (41) become:
−k + ψ + (T − t)(βA + D) = 0, (56)
and,
˙ ψ = −(A + D) + βA. (57)
Integrating ˙ ψ over [t,T], we have, for all t ∈ [tb,T] :
ψ (T) − ψ (t) = −((1 − β)A + D)(T − t) (58)
Using (45), this simpliﬁes to
ψ (t) = ((1 − β)A + D)(T − t) (59)
Plugging this condition into (56), we have
k = (A + 2D)(T − t). (60)
Integrating this equation over [tb,t], we get
K (t) = K (tb) + (A + 2D)
 





















T−ta + (A + D)ta − (A + D) t
2
 






βA+D if t ∈ [ta,tb]
K (tb) + (A + 2D)
 







































Diﬀerentiating (40) and plugging (41), we have
(T − t)(βA + D) ˙ ρ − ρD = A + D + ˙ k. (65)















A + D + ˙ k (t)
  






T−τ dτ if D = 0 and βA > 0
(66)
Diﬀerentiating (51), we have










Plugging this expression into (66), and taking t = tb we obtain (notice that ρ(tb) = 1):
If D > 0,
D =
 













































Now using (52) and (60) at t = tb, we have





















Now we can ﬁnd ta, tb, K (ta) and K (tb) by solving (63), (64), ((67) or (68)) and (70).








T−ta + (A + D)ta − (A + D)t for t ∈ [0,ta],
K (ta)
βA
βA+D (T − ta)
βA
βA+D (T − t)
−
2βA+D
βA+D for t ∈ [ta,tb],











T−ta + (A + D)ta − (A + D) t
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βA+D if t ∈ [ta,tb]
K (tb) + (A + 2D)
 









Suﬃciency theorem Let (K∗,Y ∗,k∗,S∗
T) be a candidate optimal solution. Assume that
all the necessary conditions are satisﬁed by (K∗,Y ∗,k∗,S∗
T) and the associated time path
(ψ
∗,ρ∗,λ













∗ [1 − k] + ϕ




f be the payoﬀs obtained by carrying the plans (K∗,Y ∗,k∗,S∗
T) and (K#,Y #,k#,S
#
T )































where the asterisk over the multipliers indicates that we use the same path (ψ
∗,ρ∗,λ
∗,µ∗,ϕ∗)
for both L∗ and L#.
Since λ
∗k∗ = 0, µ∗ [1 − k∗] = 0 and ϕ∗ [S∗













































∗ ≥ 0,µ∗ ≥ 0 and ϕ∗ ≥ 0, and since feasibility requires that k# ≥ 0, 1−k# ≥ 0
and S
#
















































































Now, under the assumption that L(K,Y,k,ST,ψ
∗,ρ∗,λ





























































T = ϕ∗, and from the necessary conditions ∂L∗
∂k∗ = 0 , ∂L∗
∂K∗ = −˙ ψ
∗
and ∂L∗




# ≥ −˙ ψ
∗
(K
∗ − K) − ˙ ρ
∗(Y













































































































































































which is identically zero, because (i) K∗(0) = K#(0) = 0 and Y ∗(T) = Y #(T) = 0 by
feasibility, and (ii) ψ
∗(T) = 0 and ρ∗(0) = 0 as transversality conditions for KT and Y0 being
free.
It follows that V ∗
f − V
#
f ≥ 0. ￿
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